Strategic Plan for next Irregular US Coalition Conflict Essay

Strategic Plan for next Irregular US Coalition Conflict - Essay Example In order to bring about strategies that eliminate the challenges for the U.S irregular conflicts, a mixture of collaborative, competitive and authoritative approached are necessitated to bring about effectiveness and flexibility (Keravuori para 2). Formulating strategies that result in war effectiveness require critical understanding of the numerous actors, and their conflicting ideologies, as well as applying a multiphased approach in war. Above all, a careful examination of the economic effects and actions of the irregular conflict should be given precedence, and negotiations should be employed to the maximum. Irregular conflicts are hard to describe, and knowing how to respond to irregular conflicts is inherently intricate for an outsider like United States (Kramer para 3). Efficient strategies demand that strategists should take into account evolving, mutually dependent and multistakeholder nature of irregular conflicts. The United States defeat in the Vietnam War, setbacks in va rious battles like Somalia, Bosnia and Lebanon, coupled with military and political complexities in Iraq and Afghanistan underscores the limits of United States military traditional supremacy. The supremacy has not in the recent past yielded any influential success against non state actors practicing protracted welfare. America has based its military supremacy on firepower that has been counterproductive. This is a problem that is founded on the country’s military and political culture (Keravuori para 5). The counterinsurgency wars that America engages in are mostly political in nature, rather than being jus ad bellum. This implies that the American government risks the lives of its citizens and that of citizens in countries like afghan and Iraq when national concerns and interests are not at stake. The pentagon’s aversion to counterinsurgency is soundly rooted in the American manner of welfare. Since the early 1940s, the army has trained, outfitted and planned for lar ge scale predictable operations for large scale adversaries, and it has traditionally utilized military operations even against irregular conflicts. Barring a philosophical change in the United States’ armed and political culture, America runs a noteworthy risk of failure whenever it goes into irregular wars of choice. The reason is that great power involvement in small wars is nearly always a subject of preference. Such wars do not involve central United States’ security interests, other than placing the confines of American military on display. The war in Iraq is the latest illustration of the confines of America’s power. Observers argue that sending American renowned generals like Rommel Erwin in the operation Iraqi freedom was an incompetent move. The reason is that Iraqi forces were not difficult to deal with as they were poorly trained, incompetently led, demoralized and badly equipped. Thus, sending massively armed troops in Iraq underscores achievement o f America’s military. Neoimperialist Boot Max praised America on its Iraq invasion as one of the signals of military success in American history. These words were one sided as they anticipated a win situation for America. However, this was not the case as America not only lost in its political objective, but also in eliminating insurgency that was erupting day by day. Three years after Iraq incursion, boot expressed